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PREFACE
 
We are pleased to publish Sociocultural Factors in the Industrializa­
tion of Korea, by Bon Ho Koo, as the thirty-second in our series of 
Occasional Papers, which features reflections on broad policy issues 
by noted scholars and policy makers. 
In 1960, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world; just 
thirty years later its economy was one of the largest in the developing 
world. As one of Asia's "Four Tigers," Korea has been subject to exten­
sive study by those hoping to emulate its dramatic economic growth. 
In this paper, Dr. Koo addresses an important but little-discussed 
issue: cultural factors in Korea's industrialization. Economic policies 
were certainly instrumental in stimulating Korea's extraordinary devel­
opment, but Dr. Koo looks into the causes underlying the actions of 
government officials, managers, and workers. He examines the role of 
the values held by most Koreans, particularly their attitude toward edu­
cation, in economic performance. ie then goes on to consider the prog­
nosis for the Korean economy in the light of current social conditions. 
Dr. Koo, president of the Korea Development Institute, is well 
qualified to address this topic. lie has an intimate knowledge of the 
Korean ecomomy, gained both from his academic research and from 
his experience advising the government on issues such as economic 
restructuring and education reform. 
Scholars and policy makers have been drawing lessons from the 
development experience of Korea for several years, but the picture is 
not complete without a consideration of sociocultural factors. By fill­
ing this gap, Dr. Koo has made a valuable contribution to our under­
standing of the development process. 
Nicohis Ardito-Barletta 
General Director 
International Center for Economic Growth 
Panama City, Panama 
Septe-imber 1992 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Bon Ho Koo is president of the Korea Development Institute in Seoul, 
Korea. From 1981 to 1987 he was a professor of economics at 
Hanyang University in Seoul. He has also served as president of the 
Korea Energy Research Institute, vice president and research director 
of the Korea Development Institute, and assistant professor of econom­
ics at Georgia State University. Dr. Koo has been involved in economic 
policy making in Korea as chairman of the Financial Reform Conmis­
sion, secretary general of the Presidential Commission on Economic 
Restructuring, and a member of the Monetary Board of the Bank of 
Korea. He is also a member of the Presidential Commission for Educa­
tional Reform. Dr. Koo received his Ph.D. in economics from the 
University of Minnesota. 
BON HO KOO
 
Sociocultural Factors in the
 
Industrialization of Korea
 
The Republic of Korea is one of the four Asian newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs), which are distinguished from most other develop­
ing countries by their remarkable growth during the past three decades 
(the other three NIEs are Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). Among 
the NIEs, Korea stands out because of its large population and gross 
national product (GNP), which contribute to its technological advan­
tages and more sophisticated industrial structure. 
In becoming one of the most dynamic NIEs, Korea has had to cope 
with unique handicaps. The Korean War (1950-1953) destroyed most 
of the coun!ry's industrial base and left Korea more impoverished than 
its East Asian neighbors at the time. In addition, Korea has had to 
maintain greater military expenditures than most other developing 
countries, in both absolute and relative terms. Furthermore, the polity 
has continued to be more unstable than other Asian NIEs. Korea's 
economic success in the face of such difficulties makes the country an 
especially interesting case study of the importance of social factors for 
developmenw. 
My aim in this paper is to identify elements of Korea's social 
environment that seem to have contributed to the economic success the 
country has had since the early 1960s. The immediate causes of 
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Korea's emergence as a dynamic NIE have been its economic policies 
and the characteristics of its workers, firms, and government; I will 
look at these factors first. I will then attempt to distinguish from these 
causes the underlying features of Korean society that have contributed 
to the country's remarkable economic performance so far. 
I offer two caveats with regard to tile ilterpretation of this paper. 
First, the paper focuses on Korea's economic performance until 1990, 
not on its current performance. Various aspects of a country or its 
economy are bound to charge over time. Therefore, many of the obser­
vations of Korea's economic performance and social environment may 
not apply to the Korean economy today. Second, since the ultimate aim 
of the paper is to explain Korea's economic success so far, the anal' sis 
focuses on positive features of policies and economic performance. 
Problems that have accompanied rapid and sustained industrialization 
will be de-emphasized. 
Some of the analyses made here in regard to Korea may apply to 
other Asian NIEs as well, but I will make no attempt in thi, paper to 
distinguish those that do and those that do not. 
I will begin by reviewing Korea's economic pecformance since the 
country's economic takeoff in the early 1960s. tkih emphasis on how 
Korea's economic dynamism was created and sustained. I will show, in 
particular, how workers. business, and the government have interacted 
with each other in the process. Next I will examine the sources of the 
past competitive advantage of Korean firms. I will also briefly discuss 
how these firriis have substantially upgraded their technological level. I 
will continue by assessing the role the government has played in the 
course of Korea's rapid industrialization and discus the source of the 
government's success in contributing to economic growth. Finally, I 
will examine the social factors that seem to have formed a foundation 
for the more *traditional" sources of Korea's economic growth and 
industrial dynamism, concluding with a few observations on the future 
of the Korean economy. 
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Economic Performance and Policies, 1960-1990 
This section will briefly review the development of the Korean econ­
omy since the early 1960s, focusing on those elements that have con­
tributed to the rapid and sustained growth rate and emphasizing the 
role of the governmen. 
Export-led takeoff in the 1960s. The rapid growth of the Korean 
economy began in the early 1960s. In the 1950s, after the Korean War, 
Korea's economy grew at an average annuei rate of 4 percent. Begin­
ning in 1963, the growth rate more than doubied, averaging 9.8 percent 
for the rest of the decade. This rapid growth coincided with a major 
as the country's stag­transformation in Korea's industrial structure, 
nant, agrarian economy became a dynamic, industrializing one (Table 
1). At the beginning of the decade, agricultural output accounted for 
well over a third of gross domestic product (GDP). By the end ol the 
1960s, the share of agriculture had declined to a little over a quarter, 
although the sector's output grew at an average annual rate of 7.7 
percent in real terms. During the same period, the share of workers 
engaged in the sector declined from around 70 percent of the total to 
50 percent. 
The decline of agriculture's share in1 the economy was a natural 
consequence of the rapid growth of other sectors. The share of manu­
facturing in GDP rose from about 14 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 
1970, as its value added grew at an average annual rate of 16.7 percent 
in real terms. The workers in the sector accounted for a mere 1.5 
percent of all employed in 1960, and this share rose to 13.1 in 1970. 
The rest of the economy-that is, construction, infrastructure, and ser­
vices-also expanded in the 1960s, but much more slowly. 
Thus, the impetus behind the rapid growih and structural transforma­
tion was the expansion of the manufacturing sector, which was propelled 
by the export demand for the sector's output. Exports increased at an 
average annual rate of 35 percent in real terms from 1963 to 1969. 
Clearly, this increase was made possible. as Table 2 shows, by the rise in 
nontraditional exports. They included nearly all the labor-intensive man­
ufactured goods in which developing countries traditionally possess a 
comparative advantage, such as clothing, footwear, luggage, textiles, 
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TABLE 1 Industrial Structure of Korea inSelected Years, 1960-1990 (percentage) 
Agriculture, 
forestry, and 
fishing Mining Manufacturing Othera 
Structure of GDP
 
1960 36.9 2.1 13.6 47.4
 
1965 38.7 1.8 17.7 41.8
 
1970 25.8 1.3 21.0 51.9
 
1975 24.9 1.4 26.6 47.1
 
1980 15.1 1.4 30.6 52.9
 
1985 13.9 1.5 29.2 55.3
 
1990 9.1 0.5 29.2 61.2
 
Structure of employment
 
1960 68.3 0.3 1.5 29.9
 
1965 58.6 0.9 9.4 31.1
 
1970 50.4 1.1 13.1 35.4
 
1975 45.7 0.5 18.6 35.2
 
1980 34.0 0.9 21.6 43.5
 
1985 24.9 1.0 23.4 50.7
 
1990 18.3 0.4 26.9 54.4
 
a. "Other" includes transport and communication infrastructure, education, and other 
services, including construction. 
SOURCES Economic Plznning Board, Major Statistics of the Korean Economy (various
issues); Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1962. 
leather goods, and simple fabricated metals. During the 1960s, the share 
of these goods in total exports shot vp frorm 12 to 67 percent, and that of 
manufactures from 13 to 70 percent. 
Behind Korea's successful export-led takeoff of the 1960s were 
conscious efforts by the government to promote exports. These efforts 
allowed full use of labo-the factor with which the country was most 
richly endowed. Korea's economic 'akeoff may thus be explained in 
terms of the standard comparative advantage theory. But this explana­
tion misses the most important aspect of the takeoff by failing to depict 
the national saga behind it. 
There were three important players in this saga: the workers, the 
entrepreaeurs, and the government. All were united in the national 
drive for export-led economic growth. The clear leader in the 1960s 
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TABLE 2 Composition of Korean Exports, 1960-1980 
-- -- Share of total exports-(%) 
Value of Raw Increment­
total materials, Non- Machinery al share 
exports Food inedible, traditional and of non­
(millions and live except exports transpor traditional 
of current animals fuels (SITC equipment exports

Year US$) (SITC 0) (SITC 2) 6 and 8) (SITC 7) (%)
 
1960 33 29.6 48.2 12.3 0 3 n.a. 
1961 41 21.9 51.3 11.7 2.2 9.5 
1962 55 40.0 35.2 14.8 2.6 23.9 
1963 87 20.8 30.2 39.8 4.7 82.5 
1964 119 22.1 26.4 46.6 1.9 65.1 
1965 175 16.1 21.2 57.6 3.1 81.0 
1966 250 16.5 18.6 57.3 3.8 56.4 
1967 320 11.8 18.1 62.0 4.4 79.0 
1968 455 9.8 13.5 68.2 5.4 82.8 
1969 623 8.1 11.7 66.9 8.5 63.2 
1970 835 7.8 12.0 68.7 7.4 73.9 
1971 1,068 6.5 8.9 72.5 8.2 86.2 
1972 1,624 6.6 7.3 71.2 10.6 68.9 
1973 3,225 7.6 6.1 70.5 12.3 69.7 
1974 4,460 6.7 4.4 67.8 15.1 60.7 
1975 5,081 11.9 3.0 66.3 13.8 55.5 
1976 7,715 6.6 2.5 69.5 16.6 75.8 
1977 10,046 9.4 3.0 65.3 17.3 51.4 
1978 12,710 7.3 2.6 65.5 20.4 66.1 
1979 15,055 7.2 2.4 65.1 20.6 62.7 
1980 17,505 6.6 1.9 65.9 19.7 71.0 
n.a. = not available.
 
SITC - Standard International Trade Classification.
 
a.This refers to a given year's share of nontraditional exports in that year's rise in total 
exports. Nontraditional exports refer to SITC, 6,manufactured goods classified chiefly by

material, and SITC 8,miscellaneous manufactured arl~cles.
 
SOURCE- Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook (vanous issues).
 
was the newly installed government headed by General Park Chung-
Hee, wno seized power in a coup in 1961 and launched the drive, 
determined to fulfill his political commitment to "free the natioi from 
poverty." Korea's relentless export drive thus began under President 
Park's personal command. 
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The promise that exports held for economic growth and prosperity 
brought workers, male and female, from all over the country, espe­
cially from rural areas, to the factories. The whole population was 
determined to "live better," and this determination made it a hard­
working labor force. The same determination made the workers ex­
tremely cooperative and even submissive to their employers and to the 
government. 
The expor,'t drive was spearheaded, howevcr, by the businessmen, 
who exceeded both the workers and the officials in their dedication to 
work. With acumen, ingenuity, and adaptability, they found new prod­
uct niches and opened up new markets, often at great risk, and thus 
sustained remarkably rapid increases in exports. 
Turbulence in the 1970s. The 1970s were a decade of great turbu­
lence for Korea, both politically and economically. Nonetheless, the 
Korean economy managed to grow annually at more than 9 percent on 
the average. During that decade, Korea also laid the foundation of the 
sophisticated industrial structure it has today. 
The oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 inflicted major difficulties 
upon the economy. These shocks were aiccompanied by severe world­
wide recessions, which compounded the Korean economy's difficulties 
by causing sharp declines in exports. Korea overcame the aftermath of 
the first oil shock by doubling its efforts to strengthen the competitive­
ness of its exports, opening up new export markets in the Middle East, 
and beginning to export construction services. The country was highly 
successful in these efforts. 
Prompted by the oil price shock, the Korean government also 
accelerated its heavy industry drive and began to implement the so­
called heavy and chemical industry (HCI) policy on an enormous 
scale. As part of this policy, a wide array of incentives was offered 
to firms in many HCIs, including iron and steel, electric and non­
electric machinery, chemicals, shipbuilding, and automobiles. Build­
ing on the existing investments, Korea was especially successful 
with steel and shipbuilding, as the well-known cases of the Pohang 
Steel Company (POSCO) and the Hyundai Shipyard demonstrate. 
But investments in other HCIs did not begin to pay off until the 
mid- 1980s. 
II Sociocultural Fa'tors in the IndustrializationofKorea 
The lavish overinvestment in HCIs weakened the international 
1970s, and togethercompetitiveness of exports toward the end of the 
with the second oil price shock, the assassination of President Park late 
in 1979, and other subsequent shocks, caused a major crisis in the 
Korean econoniy from 1979 to 1981. Until !978, hcwever, the Korean 
economy's export-led growth engine worked as vigorously as in the 
1960s. This growth is particularly remarkable considering that the gov­
ernment begat to reduce the scope and depth of export incentives in 
the early 1970s. 
was again the jointThe continued export dynamism of the 1970s 
accomplishment of the Korean government, business, and labor. Busi­
ness, especialiy the newly emerging conglomerates, played an even 
success than it had in themore important role in Korea's economic 
preceding decade. 
Crisis and recovery in the 198Gs. Economic performance was 
much more dynamic during the 1980s than in either of the two preced­
ing decades. The decade opened with the worsening of the economic 
crisis, stemming from excessive HCI promotion, that had begun in the 
late 1970s. In addition to the second oil price shock. there was a 
worldwide recession and the consequent intenational interest rate 
shock in the early 1980s. A major sociopolitical crisis also occurred in 
1980 following the assassination of President Park, as well as a major 
harvest failure due to an unprecedented cold spell in the summer of 
1980. All these crises showed up dramatically in the growth rate of 
-3.7 percent in 1980. 
Once again Korea responded to crisis swiftly and began to recover 
in 1983. Under the new government of President Chun Doo-Hwan, 
Korea adopted a comprehensive package of far-reaching policy re­
forms. These reforms were founded on an entirely new philosophy of 
the role of the government in the economy. The new philosophy aimed, 
at least in principle, to liberate the markets from government interven­
tion and regarded stabilization of the economy and the strengthening of 
market competition as the primary role of the government. 
Thus, during the early 1980s, the government adopted forceful 
replaced fixed exchange rates with managedstabilization measures, 

flexibility, realigned investment in regard to HCIs, introduced a system
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of antitrust measures, privatized commercial banks and other public 
enterprises, began to phase out the system of industry assistance, and 
initiated a major multiyear program of trade liberalization. 
The economy soon responded to these reforms with renewed dyna­
mism. After the international currency realignment of the Plaza Accord 
in 1985, it again began to grow at record-breaking high rates, and the 
current account began to show large su:-pluses. This turnaround in the 
balance-of-payments situation, together with the subsequent rise in in­
temational pressure for the opening of the economy, helped accelerate 
policy reforms designed to liberalize and internationalize the economy. 
The dynamic growth has continued, despite the spontaneous change of 
the political order into a full democracy in 1987 and the subsequent 
liberalization of the labor market. 
With these and other reform measures of the 1980s, the govern­
ment has been rapidly relinquishing market intervention. The markets 
are now vibrant with free prices and intense competition, both domes­
tic and international. The Korean economy has matured a great deal 
since the early 1960s. 
In this way, Korea has achieved something of an economic mir­
acle. In 1960 Korea was still one of the poorest agricultural countries 
in the world, with a small and stagnant economy. Now, Koiea is a 
leading NIE, with an economy among the largest in the developing 
world. The speed of Korea's economic growth has been astonishing. 
From 1962 to 1990, real GNP grew at an average 9.0 percent annually. 
By 1990, Korea's per capita GNP had risen to US$5,569. 
Rapid industrialization continues. In 1990, manufacturing ac­
counted for 29.2 percent of GDP, while sectors other than manufactur­
ing, mining, and agriculture accounted for 61 percent. Agriculture 
accounted for considerably less than 19.0 percent of total employment 
in that year. Manufactures accounted for more than 95 percent of 
Korea's exports. Of the value added in manufacturing, heavy industry, 
consisting of capital- and technology-intensive manufacturing such as 
steel, automobiles, ships, and electronic products, accounted for 62 
percent in 1990. 
Korea no longer suffers from the chronic trade deficits it had until 
1985. As a result, Korea's net foreign indebtedness, which once ex­
ceeded US$36 billion, was down to US$6 billion at the end of 1990. 
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The Role of Firms in Korea's Industrialization 
Among the most important elements in the rapid Korean industrializa­
tion during the postwar period were the large private sector firms, for it 
was these finns that developed new technologies and products to com­
pete in the international market. In this section I will examine a few 
salient characteristics of Korean firms during the 1960s and the 1970s 
and discern the sources of their success competing in the international 
market. I will also take a close look at the nature of the technological 
development effort that firms have made in the past. 
Characteristics of Korean firms. First, Korean firms were 
growth oriented rather than profit oriented in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
reason Koreani finns, unlike other developing country firms, adopted 
an export-oriented strategy was to increase the volume of production, 
as well as to respond to government incentives. Large-scale production 
allowed the firms to cut production costs and master technelogy. 
Seccnd, Korean firms on the whole managed the development and 
marketing of their products and processing technologies themselves 
rather than relying on foreign multinational finns. Direct foreign in­
vestment in Korea was limited in the 1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, 
most of the key imported factors of production came in an unpackaged 
form. 
Third, Korean firms were generally less averse to risks than firms 
in other developing countries. Investments in such large-scale indus­
tries as steel, shipbuilding, automobiles, and some subsectors of elec­
tronics demonstrate this. This willingness to take risks was due partly 
to the large size of the major Korean firms and partly to a risk-sharing 
program with the government. Large firms seemed to have a greater 
financial capacity to bear risks. 
Finally, a small number of conglomerater played a dominant role 
in the Korean business sector. One of the sources of their strength was 
their ability to pool scarce resources, particularly highly skilled engi­
neers and scientists and talented middle managers. By pressuring these 
firms to compete in the international market, the government tried to 
pievent them from becoming inefficient, as frequently happened in the 
cases of protected and concentrated markets in developing countries. 
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Sources of the competitive advantage of Korean firms. The 
success of Korean firms in international markets can be traced to the 
five following factors. 
An environment ofcompetition. Why did managers and workers of 
Korean firms work so hard and aggressively in increasing the size of 
firms and in moving up market? Simply put, it was due to the pressure 
of competition, espccially in their export market. Because of the ad­
vantages of large size and government encouragement, exports and 
entry into foreign markets, such as the construction industry in the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, always played an important role in 
firm strategy. Domestic competition among large firms was also fierce 
in a number of sectors. Thus, the environment of competitive pressure 
was a factor in making Korean firms efficient and competitive. 
The low cost of workers and managers. Because Korean finns in 
the 1960s and 1970s were competing mainly on the basis of price 
competitiveness and the labor-intensive nature of their export goods, 
the availability of low-cost workers and managers was an important 
source of competitive advantage. For instance, the labor cost to pro­
duce one ton of cold-rolled coil at a Korean steel mill was less than 
one-half that of Japan and one-fifth that of the United States as late as 
1985 (Barnett and Crandall 1986). Although the productivity of Ko­
rean workers was low relativ'e to that of workers in industrial countries, 
it was relatively high compared with that of workers in developing 
countries. 
Training. Most Korean companies emphasize training programs, 
partly because top managers perceive training as necessary and partly 
because government policy encourages worker training and education. 
In-house training programs for new workers emphasize not only job 
skills, but also firm loyalty. Since most finns grew quickly as the 
overall economy grew, managers rapidly moved up in rank. They re­
ceived increasing incentives and responded with increasing loyalty. 
This system, with its strong achievement mentality, produced a large 
number of dedicated and hard-working workers and managers. 
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Centralized orga:izatio,i. Until the early 197(s, Korean firms were 
organized with a fairly centralized, but not rigid structure. 1,hwas an 
efficient organization system ,or companies that had to learn new tech­
nologies and acquire know-how from abroad by imitating rather than 
by innovating. Since the late 1980s however, as technology innovation 
and a quick, flexible response to a changing market enviropment have 
become more critical, many firms have begun to try a more decentral­
ized system of decision making and probiem solving. 
Government support for i'search and development. Government 
tax policy appears to have been instrumental in encouniging firms to 
invest in research and developmetit. Various public R&D centers sup­
ported by government "indjoint R&D activities between the public and 
private sectors also gradually became important. As shown in the Table 
3, R&D expenditure increased gradually, reflecting the efforts by the 
government and the private firms. 
Technological development in Korea. Korea achieved technolog­
icai advances by gradually but continually adapting piocesses and 
products to changing market circumstances. Firms generally acquired 
ever more sophisticated technological capabilities in piecemeal fash­
ion. These new technologies, which contributed to the development of 
new industries and broadened and deepened capabilities in established 
industries, allowed for greater proficiency and increased differentiation 
in existing capabilities and for new technological activities. 
Korean technological development depended mostly on informal 
transfers, including imitation and apprenticeship, rather than on propri­
etary transfers of technology, such as direct foreign investment and 
licensing. Informal transfers of technology, turnkey projects, and ma­
chinery imports also played a large role. 
Technology acquisition was accomplished through a policy of de­
liberate import substitution. The pattern of technology imports continu­
ally shifted as local capabilities were developed and as new industries 
sprang up with the emerging competitive advantage. The pattern of 
exports also shifted rapidly in response to the acquisition of technolog­
ical capabilities. 
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TABLE 3 Research and Development in Korea in Selected Years, 1963-1989 
R&D expenditures R&D expenditures Researchers per 
Year (100 million won) as a % of GNP 10,000 people 
1963 12 0.25 0.7 
1965 21 0.26 1.0 
1970 105 0.38 1.8 
1975 427 0.42 2.9 
1980 2,117 0.58 4.8 
1985 11,552 1.48 10.1 
1986 15,233 1.68 11.4 
1987 18,780 1.77 12.7 
1988 23,474 1.86 13.5 
1989 27,051 1.92 15.6 
SOURCE Korea Industrial Research Institute, Ma.or Indicators of Industral Technology 
(Seoul, 1989), p. 20. 
Export activity in turn enlarged technological capability by facil­
itating technology transfers and by stimulating efforts to develop 
new technology. Foreign buyers contributed to product innovation by 
demanding certain characteristics from exported products. The tran ,­
fer of know-how from export buyers contributed to minor inneva­
tions in the manufacturing process, which led to gradual 
improvements that had great cumulative effects. Thus the drive to 
penetrate overseas markets stimulated efforts leading to the gradual 
upgrading of product standards. 
Until the late 1970s industrialization was based largely on profi­
ciency in process technology rather than design adaptation. In the de­
velopment of process technology, the assimilation and adaptation of 
technology by domestic producers and the diffusion of technology 
among domestic firms played a greater role than the formal transfer of 
technology through direct foreign investment and licensing agree­
ments. For instance, in industries with product-specific process tech­
nology, such as the chemical industry, Korean engineers participated 
with foreign engineers in the initial project and gained experience with 
production and plant expansion. Korean engineers then assumed a rap­
idly expanding role in project design and execution when the second 
and subsequent plants were constructed. Their involvement in project 
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impiementatioa expanded because of their concerted efforts to assimi­
late the know-how involved in project design and execution. 
Korea's rapid industrialization without heavy reliance on propri­
etary transfers of technology can be explained in part by the nature of 
technology and product differentiation in export industries. Many of 
the industries used relatively mature technology, so that the mastery of 
well-establishd methods, embodied in equipment readily available 
from foreign suppliers, was sufficient to permit efficient production. 
The. products of these industries were either highly standardized or 
differentiated in technologically minor respects and did not greatly 
depend on brand recognition. In such industrier, licensing or direct 
foreign investment offered few advantages as far as technology acqui­
sition and overseas marketing were concerned. 
In the 1980s, however, technological development began to in­
volve greater reliance on licensing and direct foreign investment as 
well as on R&D, as competitive advantages emerged in technologi­
cally sophisticated industries. Private R&D expenditures expanded 
rapidly with an increasing number"of private research centers. Korean 
industries do not yet have much capability in product desigii and basic 
project engineering, because firms have been mostly imitative in their 
R&D strategy. Only recently have some Korean firms begun to move 
from an imitative to a leading position. 
The Role of the Government in Korean Industrialization 
The previous two sections can be summarized as follows: first, since 
the early 1960s the Korean economy, led by exports, has grown at 
remaikably high rates. Second, rapid growth of the 2conomy has been 
assoc ated with rapid industrialization. Third, Korea's economic suc­
cess through most of its developmental years has: been founded on 
close collaboradua among workers, entrepreneurs, and the govern­
ment. Those discussions made clear that, at least until recently, the 
government played an active role in the promotion of Korea's rapid 
industrial ization. 
The government that presided over the economy throughout most 
of Korea's modern development unil 1987 was an autheitarian one. 
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Until 1979, the country was ruled by General Park Chung-Hee, who 
was formally elected president in 1963. President Park was assassi­
nated in 1979 and was succeeded by another strong ruler, President 
Chun Doo-Hwan. Authoritarianism was finally abolished in Korea in 
the summer of 1987, when Roh Tae-Woo, who was Chun's candidate 
for the presidency at the time and subsequently won the presidential 
election, declared that Korea was a democracy. During the first two 
regimes, especially the Park regime, there was a considerable degree of 
government intervention in the markets. 
These aspects of the Park regime raise the ultimate question con­
cerning Korea's so-called success story: have the government interven­
tions in the markets contributed to Korea's rapid and sustained 
industrialization, or have they hindered it'? What has been the nature of 
the relationship between the interventionist government and the dy­
namic private sector? A related question is, did authoritarianism con­
tribute to Korea's remarkable economic performance or did it affect 
the economy negatively? 
On the one hand, according to the teachings of neoclassical eco­
nomics, interventions in the market could not have contributed to 
Korea's rapid and successful industrialization, because they tend to 
suppress the dynamism of the private sector. Interventions normally 
nurture and promote inefficiencies. On the other hand, it seems undeni­
able that on the whole the government played a critical and positive 
role in the promotion of Korea's rapid anst sustained industrialization. 
These two seemingly contradictory positions must be reconciled. 
The Park government inherited a complex mixture of government 
interventions in the markets; its respone was primarily to rearrange 
and adjust this mixture to ensure improved economic performance. As 
a result, there have been continuous market-oriented policy reforms 
and, carried forward by the subsequent governments, these reforms 
have sustained the dynamism of the Korean economy and contributed 
to a long-term trend toward liberalization of the economy. The result 
was a growing conformity with neoclassical policy prescriptions. This 
process was occasionally interrupted by policy mistakes, but these 
were soon followed by corrective reforms. 
Major po'licy reforms included the strengthening of export promo­
tion (1960s); exchange rate reform (early 1960s); price stabil!iation 
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efforts, tax refoims, increases in the interest rate, and a substantial 
degree of import liberaliza:ion (mid-1960s); reductions in export assis­
tance (early 1970s); promotion of heavy and chemical industiies (mid­
1970s); a second and major round of import liberalization (late 1970s 
to the present); the floating of the exchange rates and regulation of 
conglomerates (1980s); comprehensive price stabilization measures, 
further cuts in export assistance, reductions in indu.,try assistance and 
investment realignment in heavy and chemical industries, and 
privatization of commercial banks (early 1980s); another round of 
major tax reforms, the labor market liberalization, and fiscal restructur­
ing (late 1980s). 
What has sustained such vigorous policy reform? And what has 
made these policy reforms and, more generally, the government man­
agement of the economy effective'? There are four important factors. 
First and foremost, the Korean government, especially during the 
Park regime, remained strongly and unequivocally committed to the 
goal of economic growth through a strategy of export promotion. The 
clear-cut commitment to economic growth was important in signaling 
the direction in which national energy and resources were to be mobi­
lized. At the operational level, it unambiguously indicated the direction 
in which policies were to be formulated by government officials and 
anticipated by businessmen. More fundamentally, at a time when the 
economy was ,;tagnant and poverty widespread, the commitment to 
economic growth was critical in enlisting popular support for govern­
ment and its economnic and other policies. 
From the outset the Park government realized that the Korean 
economy could not sustain high growth on the basis of its domestic 
market. For this reason, it adopted the strategy of export-led economic 
growth and relentlessly pursued export promotion. The clarity of this 
strategy for economic growth, together with its subsequent success, 
also helped make economic policy making easier and more efficient. 
The policies were judged simply in terms of their contributions to 
exports, and falling exports prompted early identification and revision 
of inappropriate policies. 
Other important factors in the overall soundness of Korea's eco­
nomic policies weee the flexibility and adaptability of policy making. 
Policy making was flexible in the sense that poor decisions were 
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quickly corrected. The government did not hesitate to admit mistakes 
and take corrective actions, often reversing its earlier positions, to the 
point that the government's repetitive trial-and-error process became 
widely criticizcd. Policy making was adaptable in the sense that the 
decision make, was receptive to all options. 
The government's flexible and adaptable response to problems 
helped Korea overcome such crises as the two oil price shocks and the 
international interest rate shock with remarkable success. 
Over the long term, this flexibility and adaptability also subjected 
policies to continual reforms and kept these reforms market oriented 
on the whole. 
A number of factors made decision making flexible and adaptable. 
The ultimate goal of economic growth and the export-promotion strat­
egy designed to achieve i: were clearly spelled out. More fundamen­
tally, the Korean government approached this goal in a pragmatic 
manner. It would do almost anything to achieve economic growth and 
in so doing w,s not bound by any religious value or ideology. 
Decision making was highly centralized, with key decisions made 
by President Park himself. Park consulted only a small number of 
people, and the legislature was involved only nominally. This process 
allowed decision making to be speedy and free from populism, but it 
also encouraged hasty decisions and led to insufficient discussions 
among officials. 
A third factor that contributed to the overall soundness of' Korea's 
economic policies was a high level of cooperation between the govern­
ment and the business sector. Empowered with incentives, regulations, 
and, most important, control over bank credit, the government domi­
nated the business sector. Nonetheless, it regarded business as an im­
portant partner. The government consulted the business sector closely 
on all important policy issues. At various formal levels up to the presi­
dent, the government exchanged views and infornation with business 
at meetings such as the monthly Export Promotion Council meetings 
and at discussions of the five-year-plans and other major policy docu­
ments. Business and goveniment also communicated informally 
through frequent high-level personal contacts. 
The business sector made full use of thee channels to guide and 
influence policy makers. The lour major economic organizations-the 
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Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), the Korean Chamber of Com­
merce and Industry (KCCI), the Korean Foreign Traders Association 
(KFTA), and the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Industry-as 
well as numerous industry associations, were especially instrumental in 
providing information and advising the government. 
These practices served two purposes. First, they helped keep the 
government well-informed on the state of the economy and industry as 
well as on policy options. Second, they facilitated coordination be­
tween the government and business and helped ensure business sector 
cooperation oil policy initiatives. This system therefore prevented con­
flict between the strong government and the highly dynamic business 
sector and in fact encouraged close cooperation between the two. 
To be sure, close consultations with business also tended to pro­
mote pro-business decisions, encouraging rent-seeking behavior and 
protectionism. Two major countervailing forces, however, contained 
the damage. One was the principle of export-led economic growth, 
which limited room for inefficiency. The other was the input of eco­
non'ic advisers who had rigorous training in modem economics. Offi­
cials of international lending institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund continued to provide advice based on the 
principles of the market. So did the rapidly growing group of Korean 
economists with advanced training in modem economics based at uni­
versities and research institutes. 
Finally, the Korean government, especially its economic minis­
tries, was staffed by intelligent and dedicated officials. Korean officials 
worked long hours and performed their duties with extraordinary dedi­
cation. Those at the middle and upper levels of management were 
recruited from among the best university graduates in the country and 
were generally bright and patriotic. It was those officials, in particular, 
who contributed to effective and efficient implementation of economic 
policies. 
The high quality of the Korean economic officials may be explained 
in terms of two fundamental factors. One is the tradition of meritocracy 
that President Park introduced into the Korean government, ensuring that 
able and dedicated officials, young and old, were given recognition. The 
strong motivation of the Korean government officials seems to have 
been by and large a result of this meritocracy. The other factor is Korea's 
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educational investment. Thanks to the pervasive emphasis on higher 
education, there existed a large supply of well-educated university gradu­
ates in Korea. from which able officials could be recruited. I will discuss 
these factors further in the next section. 
Korea's Social Environment 
The preceding discussions hint at a number of sociocultural factors that 
are relevant to the Korean growth and industrialization experience. In 
this section, I will group the most important ones into three broad 
categories: social values and motivation, education and formation of 
the human resource base, and acquired pragmatism and secularism. 
Social values and motivation. In this paper, I assume that at any 
given moment a society has a certain set of social values. These "invis­
ible" factors may be conducive or detrimental to economic growth and 
development. One value may act alone, or several values may interact 
with each other, compounding their intensity. Different values also 
prevail for different lengths of time. Through education and the cre­
ation of a favorable social climate, social values can be fostered and 
fortified, or they can change as a society achieves higher standards of 
living. 
At the beginning of its rapid economic growth. Korea was cohe­
sive because of its racial homogeneity, its relatively small geographic 
size, and its distinct set of social values. Some of the social values that 
have contributed to rapid and sustained economic growth in Korea are 
an eagerness to learn, a drive to improve one's socioeconomic status, a 
willingness to sacrifice for children and invest in their education, and a 
tendency to return home from abroad. All of these elements interacted 
with each other to form, in a relatively short period, a literate and 
trainable population, a hard-working and disciplined labor force, and 
adaptable bureaucrats, technocrats, businessmen, and technicians. 
Of course, these remarkable achievements are not attributable 
solely to social values, but also to the initial socioeconomic conditions 
and the social climate created in Korea in the past. For example, social 
uncertainty and a sense of vulnerability stemming from the memory of 
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absolute poverty and the threat from the north have certainly re­
inforced the people's eagerness to learn, their will to better their eco­
nomic status, and their willingness to sacrifice for the sake of their 
children's education. The political leaders' commitment to economic 
development beginning in the early 1960s, which served as the driving 
force behind successive medium-term development plans, was partly, 
if not mainly, responsible for inculcating an orientation toward the 
future and a so-called can-do spirit in Korea. Built-in social incentives 
such as significant wage and salary differentials based on the level of 
education and the likelihood of iapid promotion for the highly edu­
cated, further strengthened the social value placed on learning and 
accelerated educational development. 
Education and the formation of a human resource base. No 
matter how conducive a social value system is to ecoji-omic growth, to 
be effective itmust be translated into action; the likelihood of this may 
be a function of its intensity and pervasiveness. Some distinctive char­
acteristics of the Korean social value system in the years before 
Korea's rapid industrialization were externalized as an explosive wid­
ening of education, which, in turn, has facilitated the formation of a 
pool of human resources with a relatively high level of education, 
motivation, trainability, and ability to work together. 
The growth and development of Lducation in Korea since 1945 
have been spectacular by any standard, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
Despite the disruptions of the division of the country and the subse­
quent war, prtmary school enrollment doubled between 1945, the year 
of liberation from Japanese occupation, and 1955, two years after the 
end of the Korean War, and schools reached their saturation point in 
the late 1960s. The education explosion was evident not only in pri­
mary education but also later in secondary and higher education. Even 
without the benefit of compulsory education, enrollment in middle 
schools doubled in the decade beginning in 1952, and more than dou­
bled in another decade. The rate of students advancing to the next 
grade reached almost 100 percent by the early 1980s. The enrollment 
in high schools grew much more rapidly than that in middle schools, 
but the advancement rate to high school rose to more than 90 percent 
by the mid-1980s. The growth of enrollment in higher education 
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TABLE 4 School Enrollment in Korea in Selected Years, 1945-1990 
Type of school 1945 1952 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Elementary schools 
Thousands of 
students 1,366.0 2,369.9 3,622.7 5,749.3 5,658.0 4,868.5 
Index(1952 =100) 58 100 153 243 235 205
 
Middle schools 
Thousands of 
students 5 0 .3a 291.6 528.6 1,318.8 2,472.0 2,275.8 
Index (1952 = 100) 14a 100 181 452 848 780 
Academic high schools 
Thousands of 
students 59.4 164.5 315.6 932.6 1,473.2 
Index (1952 = 100) 100 277 531 1,570 2,480 
Vocational high schools 
Thousands of 
students 33.2 74.5 99.1 275.0 764.2 810.7 
Index (1952 = 100) 45 100 133 369 1,026 1,089 
Higher education institutions 
Thousands of 
students 7.8 34.1 101.0 193.6 597.9 1,466.9 
hidex (1952 = 100) 23 100 296 568 1,754 4,303 
a. Figures are for both middle schools and academic high schools, which were not
 
separated until after 1945.
 
SOURCES: Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook of Education (various issues);
 
National Bureau of Statistics, Social Indicators in Korea (Seoul, 1990).
 
institutions was rapid in the 1950s and 1960s and then slowed rela­
tively in the 1970s before increasing sharply in the 1980s, reaching one 
of the highest college enrollment ratios in the world. 
Because of the explosive growth of formal education, aided mainly 
by the contribution of informal education, the literacy rate in Korea 
increased dramatically from 30 percent in 1953 to over 80 percent in 
1963. In an analysis of a composite index of levels of human resource 
development using 1961 data, Fredrich Harbison and Charles A. Myers 
(1964) concluded that Korea's human resources ranked in the upper 
range of the semi-advanced countries while its per capita income level 
was within the range of the underdevcloped countries. Thus, Korea had 
fulfilled one of the most important prerequisites for economic growth 
even before its rapid and sustained industrialization took place. 
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TABLE 5 	International Comparison of Educational Enrollment, 1965 and 
1986 percentage of each age group) 
Secondary
Primary education education Higher education 
Country 1965 1986 1965 1986 1965 1986 
Korea 101 94 35 94 6 33 
Singapore 105 115 45 71 10 n.a. 
Hong Kong 103 105 29 69 5 13 
Mexico 92 114 17 55 4 16 
Brazil 108 105 16 36 2 n.a. 
Japan 100 102 82 96 13 29 
United 
States n.a. 102 n.a. 100 40 59 
West 
Germany n.a 97 n.a. 72 9 30 
n.a. =not available.
 
SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Report 1989 (New York: Oxford University
 
Press, 1989).
 
How did Korea achieve such remarkable records in educational de­
velopment in a relatively short period of time? The government certainly 
had an important role to play, despite the educational budget constraint. 
Private initiatives, however, such as private educational institutions, par­
ents, and students themselves played an even more decisive role. In the 
early 1990s, more than 40 percent of middle-school students wert en­
rolled in private schools. The corresponding ratios for high schools and 
universities were about 60 percent and more than 70 percent, respec­
tively. Parents made all possible sacrifices to finance their children's 
educational expenses, including both in-school and out-of-school expen­
ditures, while students without sufficient means took up side jobs to help 
offset the costs of education. Those who could not afford education in 
the formal sector attempted to continue their education in the informal 
sector, through night schools or other informal learning institutions, and 
even educated themselves to prepare for the nationally administered 
qualification examinations. 
In view of the length of time required for the highly educated to 
finish their degrees and for training skilled manpower, outside observ­
ers may wonder how Korea was able to obtain such a highly educated 
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work force so quickly. Many of the highly educated in Korea as late as 
the 1970s were educated abroad, and as opportunities for them multi­
plied beginning in the late 1960s, they returned home, reversing the 
brain drain. This tendency to return home was so strong that many of 
those who received degrees came back even before they had obtained 
jobs. Skilled manpower was secured mostly through on-the-job train­
ing apprenticeships, short-term training abroad, and other informal 
channels of learning. 
Acquired pragmatism and secularism. The people of Korea, on 
whom the intense drive toward economic growth and industrialization 
depended, were brought up, educated, and trained in a social climate 
with a strong achievement orientation, before they were placed in the 
government, business, and other sectors. With the introduction of an 
extensive meritocracy, a growing tendency toward secuiarism and 
pragmatism has developed throughout the Korean economy. 
Korea's successes have given rise to a "virtuous circle" of growing 
confidence, greater adaptability and flexibility, and intensified effort. 
This virtuous circle is manifested not only in management of economic 
crises by the government, technological development of finns, and 
export drives of manufacturers, but also, for example, in agricultural 
innovations by farmers and rapid, high-quality work of construction 
workers. All of these compounded have guided the course of Korea's 
rapid economic growth and industrialization with a few economic 
slowdowns over a period of three decades. 
The virtuous circle has been driven by the adaptable and flexible 
attitude of people in making purposeful efforts toward industrializa­
tion. No matter how skillful planners or policy makers may be, it is 
virtually impossible for them to be flawless in the details. The im­
plementers at different hierarchical levels, particularly those at the low­
est levels, must make adjustments within the range of the given 
objectives and broad guidelines of the plan or policy. This aspect of the 
social environment has been critical in view of the rapidity of Korean 
economic transformation and the volatility of its external economic 
environment and conditions. 
Concern is now growing in Korea, however, that the country's 
economic success has encouraged secularism and pragmatism without 
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also inc.,lcating balancing values and attitudes such as social justice 
and humanism. The relevance of this concern is underscored by the 
fact that one of the most controversial issues in Korea today is how to 
define and implemeat a more equitable pattern of distribution of the 
fruits of economic growth. It appears that it is time for Korea to care­
fully assess its social environment. 
Prognosis for the Korean Economy 
This essay has attempted to explain Korea's economic success over the 
past three decades in terms of elements of the country's social environ­
ment. I have classified these elements as social values and attitudes, 
education and the formation of a human resource base, and acquired 
pragmatism and secularism. I have also shown that certain institutional 
features, such as the nature of the government, were important in mo­
bilizing these elements. 
During recent years, especially since the process of rapid democra­
tization began in 1987, Korea has experienced an eruption of various 
social tensions and suffered from politicaf, social, and economic in­
stabilities. The new democracy touched off an explosion of acrimoni­
ous labor-management disputes, with labor rather violently wielding its 
newly gained rights in order to force maximum concessions out of 
management on wages and other aspects of the industrial relationship. 
Also, the new democracy has allowed outbursts of popular criticism 
alleging that the government had been intervening in the market to 
achieve economic growth at the expense of ,ocial equity. 
To a large degree, the eruption of these disputes and grievances 
may be regarded as a consequence of the very success of Korea's 
economic endeavors of the past three decades. 'he new democracy 
itself may be considered a result of this success, for it came largely as a 
response to the people's demand for a level of political development 
that was commensurate with the achieved level of economic develop­
ment. In addiion, labor has become expensive as a result of sustained 
increases in the workers' living standards. The clamor for social equity, 
too, would not have arisen if the economy had not grown enough to be 
able to afford it. 
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It therefore seems that the success of past economic endeavors has 
undone its own foundation, by weakening the willingness to work, 
often seen as the most crucial of Korea's social values in earlier years, 
and by depriving the government of a strong leadership role through 
democratization. Accordingly, many observers and the Koreans them­
selves have been wondering whether the so-called Korean ntiracle has 
come to an end. 
In my view, the determination to live better or to improve one's 
socioeconomic status has been a more fundamental factor than willing­
ness to work in explaining Korea's economic success so far. In the 
past, under the government leadership, Korea effected an appropriate 
interplay between this determination, the human resource base, and 
pragmatism. These three crucial elements of the social environment 
remain undiminished today; if anything, they continue to be enhanced. 
What has changed, however, is the institutional framework-that 
is, the nature of the government anl its relationship with the market. 
As a believer in the efficacy of democracy as well as of the market, I 
am convinced that the new democracy, as well as the rereat of the 
government from tht- market that was achieved during the 1980s, will 
enhance the synergistic interplay among the three most crucial ele­
ments of Korea's social environment. 
In the future, although the Koreans will work less, they will im­
prov.e their productivity more rapidly and continue to demonstrate their 
economic dynamism. Social equity will be strengthened along the way 
and will also help improve productivity. In conformity with this prog­
nosis, as a result ot strenuous efforts by the government and the busi­
ness sector, Korea's political and economic institutional structure has 
adjusted rapidly to the new environment over the past few years. As a 
result, political and social stability has already begun to prevail, and, 
after a brief interruption in 1989, the economy seems to be recovering 
its extraordinary dynamism. 
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